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CASE COMMENTS
with the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, and especially
action in some manner sanctioned or authorized by a state, other
extensions may arguably be warranted.
John Charles Lobert
Damages-Vehicle-Recovery of More Than Actual Physical
Damage When the Vehicle is Partially Destroyed
D negligently damaged the taxicab of P. The cost to repair the
taxicab was $1,349 while the difference in market value before
and after the collision was $415. P claims that under the special
circumstances of a city ordinance he is not permitted to buy a used
car and convert it to a taxicab. P, therefore, contends he must have
the cost of repair to make him whole. The lower court held he was
entitled only to the difference in fair market values. Held, affirmed.
The general rule for damages to personal property partially destroyed
is that the difference in fair market values before and after the
accident is the proper element of recovery where such is less than the
cost of repair. Here P failed to show the necessary special circum-
stances which would have made this general rule inapplicable, i.e., P
failed to show that he could not buy a used taxicab which would
satisfy the city ordinance. In the absence of such a showing he was
completely compensated by recovering the difference in fair market
values. Norview Cars Incorporated v. Crews, 156 S.E.2d 603 (Va.
1967).
The rule of damages in the principal case is a widely accepted one
used in many jurisdictions.' It focuses on the actual physical damage
inflicted. However, it is but one of several elements of recovery
available to the injured party who might also be able to obtain
recovery for loss of use or rental value, loss of profits, removal and
storage, and interest.
The puropse of compensatory damages is to compensate the person
wholly for the losses sustained concurrent with the least burden to
the wrongdoer. In cases of personal property where there has been
total destruction, this objective is achieved by awarding the fair
market value, at the time of the accident, of the item destroyed less
any salvage value. Where there has been partial destruction, the
'22 Am. JuR. 2d Damages § 145 (1965).
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general standard for measuring physical damage is the difference in
fair market value immediately before and after the accident, or the
reasonable cost of repair whichever is less.2 The West Virginia courts
follow this standard.3
An extension of usual standard for measuring physical damage
to partially destroyed personal property exists when there is no
market value for the property because of its peculiar nature.
Examples of such property are clothing, hierlooms, luggage, and
portraits. In such situations the cost of repairs will be the proper
measure of physical damage,' and each case must be considered
according to its peculiar circumstances.' In case of total destruc-
tion, the value placed upon these items by the owner can be used
to measure physical damage so long as it is not unreasonable.6 One
jurisdiction in contrast to the general rule holds the cost of repairs
is the proper measure of damages in all cases so long as the
property can be repaired.'
There is no difference in the application of the previously dis-
cussed physical damage standard to any class of vehicles. However,
when considering the other possible elements of recovery it may
become necessary to divide vehicles into two classes, commercial and
pleasure.
2 Riddle v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 137 W. Va. 733, 751, 73 S.E.2d 793,
803 (1952); Cato v. Silling, 137 W. Va. 694, 720, 73 S.E.2d 731, 746 (1952);
22 Am. JuR. 2d Damages §§ 145-48 (1965).
3 McMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273, 282, 90 S.E.2d 348 354
(1955); Riddle v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 137 W. Va. 733, 751, 73 S.E.2d 793,
803 (1952).4 Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 414 P.2d 918, 922-923 (Mont.
1966); see Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter Constr. Co., 35
Ohio Op. 212, 213, 216 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App., Hamilton Co. 1966).
In the principal case the plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of special
circumstances. It could have been shown that to satisfy the city ordinance a
used taxicab had to be purchased and that none was available either because
his own taxicab was peculiar and could not be replaced, or all other taxicabs
were in use and not available for sale. The RESTATEMmENT OF ToRTs § 928
(1939) and comments thereto are in support of the special circumstances
allowing recovery for repairs instead of the difference in market values, and
reference to it will yield other circumstances when this recovery is proper.
' Ripley v. C.I. Whitten Transfer Co., 135 W. Va. 419, 422, 63 S.E.2d
626, 628 (1951); Max Biederman, Inc. v. Henderson, 115 W. Va. 374, 377,
176 S.E. 433, 434 (1934). The courts have varied in the application of this
general rule, but these variations have simply been different evidentiary
methods of arriving at the amount necessary to give the injured party a car
equal in value to his vehicle prior to the accident.
6 Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 414 P.2d 918, 923 (Mont. 1966);
see Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter Constr. Co., 35 Ohio Op.
212, 213, 216 N.E.2d 885, 887 (Ct. App., Hamilton Co. 1966).
7 Chambers v. Cuningham, 153 Okla. 129, 130, 5 P.2d 378, 379 (1931).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court has not clearly defined these
additional elements of recovery, although there is a recognition that
such do exist. In Riddle v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company,8
the court referred to "necessary and reasonable expenses incurred
by the owner in connection with the injury."' There was a similar
reference made in another case. '° An attempt will be made here to
differentiate and define these additional areas of compensation.
In a commercial vehicle the idea behind loss of use is that the in-
jured party should be compensated for not being able to use his
vehicle for a reasonable time while repairs are being made." If the
injured party uses the damaged vehicle as a trade-in, then the period
for measuring compensation is a reasonable time until the repairs
would have been made or when he receives his new vehicle, which-
ever is shorter.2 The usual method for determining the amount
recoverable for loss of use is the cost of renting a vehicle to take
the place of the one damaged." In Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Company v. Elk Refining Company'4 the United States Court
of Appeals, applying West Virginia law, held that the cost of renting
another vehicle is a proper element of damages and that "recovery
therefor must be allowed if plaintiff is to be made whole."" The
West Virginia court has recognized that recovery for the amount
necessary to replace the damaged vehicle while being repaired is a
proper element of damages.' 6 Another standard sometimes used
to calculate the loss of use is the loss of profits (where the amount
of such profits can be made reasonably certain) caused by the fact
that plaintiff could not use his vehicle during the reasonable period
of repair.' Some courts have allowed evidence of loss of profits
8 137 W. Va. 733, 73 S.E.2d 793 (1952).
9 Id. at 751, 73 S.E.2d at 803.
0 McMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273, 282, 90 S.E.2d 348, 354
(1955).
11Plyar v. Jones, 207 Ala. 372, 373 92 So. 445, 446 (1922); Pelican
Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 170 So. 2d 573 (Miss. 1965); Moore v. Metropolitan
Ry., 82 N.Y.S. 778, 780 (App. Div. 1903); Rock Island & Gulf Refining Co.
v. Zunwalt, 239 S.W. 912, 915 (Tex. Corn. App. 1922).
2 Glass v. Miller, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 278, 282, 51 N.E.2d 299, 301 (1940).
'3 Plyar v. Jones, 207 Ala. 372, 373, 92 So. 445, 446 (1922); Pelican
Trucking Co. v. Rossetti, 170 So. 2d 573, 574 (Miss. 1965).
14 186 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1950).
15 Id. at 32.
16 See Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W. Va. 435, 445, 56 S.E.2d 756, 763
(1949).
'7Koren v. George, 159 Pa. Super. 182, 185, 48 A.2d 139, 140 (1946);
see Caso v. Haboni, 55 Cal. App 601, 602, 203 P. 1025 (1921).
1968]
3
Rowe: Damages--Vehicle--Recovery of More Than Actual Physical Damage Wh
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
to be shown only where it is proved that an adequate substitute for
the damaged property could not be obtained."
Another element of recovery for commercial vehicles is the cost
of removing the vehicle from the scene of the accident. 9 Storage,
for a reasonable time, while waiting on a decision whether or not to
repair a damaged vehicle has also been held to be compensable.2 °
An additional component damages which has been allowed in order
to make the injured party whole is the interest on the amount of loss
from the date of the injury to the trial. This applies where the
damages are reasonably ascertainable at the time of the accident.2 '
In Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Elk Refining Com-
pany22 the court discussed all the pertinent West Virginia cases and
held that in a commercial vehicle case "[t]he great weight of
authority is to the effect that full compensation for damage to or
destruction of property requires that, even in the case of unliquidated
demands, account be taken of the period that has elapsed between
the damage and the award and that allowance be made for
interest."
23
The second aspect of this problem is the recovery of additional
elements of damages for pleasure vehicles. It has been recognized
that recovery may be allowed for the loss of use of a pleasure vehicle
where it can be shown that the vehicle was needed to go to and
from work, 4 or that money was spent to rent a substitute for the
damaged automobile.25 Other cases go much further by allowing
recovery for the loss of use of a pleasure vehicle without requiring
18 Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 388, 279 N.W. 227, 231 (1938);
Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Feldkamp, 19 Ohio App. 421, 423 (1924).
9 Universal Carloading & Distrib. Co. v. McCall, 107 Ind. App. 479,
481, 25 N.E.2d 253, 254 (1940); Interurban Transp. Co. v. Strauss & Sons,
196 So. 367, 370 (La. Ct. App. 1940).
20°Adam v. English, 21 So. 2d 633, 638 (La. Ct. App. 1945); Moore v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 82 N.Y.S. 778, 780 (App. Div. 1903).
21 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Elk Refining Co., 186 F.2d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir.
1950); Hill Grocery Co. v. Caldwell, 211 Ala. 34, 35, 99 So. 354, 355 (1924);
Hawkins v. Garford Trucking Co., 96 Conn. 337, 340, 114 A. 341, 342
1921); Mayflower Investment Co. v. Stephens, 345 S.W.2d 786, 795
Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
22 186 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1950).
2 3 1 d. at 33 (emphasis added).
24 Longo v. Monast, 70 R.I. 460, 465, 40 A.2d 433, 435 (1944).
25 Hansen v. Costello, 125 Conn. 386, 389, 5 A.2d 880, 881 (1939).
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any special qualifications.26 The Restatement of Torts27 supports
the position that damages are recoverable for loss of use where a
chattel has been partially destroyed.
While the cases found dealing with recovery for removal and
storage involved commercial vehicles, 8 their holdings were not
predicated on this fact and there is no reason why removal and
storage should not be recoverable in the proper circumstances,
when the damage is to a pleasure vehicle. Interest from the date
of injury is another element of damages which should apply equally as
well to pleasure vehicles. In Chesapeake and Ohio Railway v. Elk
Refining Company, 9 the decision to include interest as an element
of recovery was not based on the fact that a commercial vehicle
was involved, but on the fact that in order to make the injured party
whole, interest must be a proper element of damages.
In ascertaining the proper method of recovery for damages to
personal property, it is necessary to look at the particular circum-
stances of each case to ascertain which elements of damages apply.
Since the object of compensatory damages is to compensate the
injured party fully for the injury, there should be included in the
measure of damages more than just the actual physical damage to
the property involved. The elements of recovery when commercial
or pleasure vehicles have been damaged include the difference be-
tween the fair market value immediately before and after the injury,
the loss of use, cost of removal and storage, and interest on the
amount of loss from the date of the accident. When a commercial
vehicle is involved the loss of profits may be an additional element
of damages. Although the West Virginia case law does not clearly
define these elements of damages, the background has been set
whereby they can be recognized in the proper circumstances.
Richard Edwin Rowe
26 McCoy v. Fleming, 153 Kan. 780, 783, 113 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1941);
Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 68 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Misc. 1947);
Oklahoma City v. Wilcoxson, 173 Okla. 433, 436 48 P.2d 1039, 1042 (1935);
Newman v. Brown 228 S.C. 472, 480, 90 S.E.2d 649, 653 (1955).
2 7 RESTATEmMNT oF Toi rs § 928 (1939). "Where a person is entitled
to a judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in
value, the damages include compensation for . . . (b) loss of use." In
neither the Restatement nor the comments thereto is there any differentiation
noted between commercial and private chattels.
28 Cases cited notes 19 & 20 supra.
29 186 F.2d 30, 33-34, (4th Cir. 1950).
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